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ABSTRACT 
 
A MULTI-PAPER EXAMINATION OF THE HISTORY OF NON-EROTIC LOVE 
WITHIN THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC DYAD 
 
Author: Danna Bodenheimer 
Supervisor: Jeffrey Applegate, Ph.D. 
 
These two papers seek to interrogate the theoretical, intellectual and personal hi tories of 
the management of love within the psychotherapeutic dyad. The first paper examin s the 
foundational work of Sandor Ferenczi. The life and theory of Sandor Ferenczi provide 
insight into both the historic admonition and the presumed dangers of loving feelings in 
the therapeutic relationship. Ferenczi believed in the creation of mutuality in all analytic 
dyads. His refusal to subscribe to a hierarchical structuring of the treatment relationship 
led to his subsequent marginalization from the traditional psychoanalytic canon for nearly 
a century. On close inspection, however, he was a formative figure who laid much of the 
groundwork for current thinking about the intersubjective and relational approaches to 
treatment. Much of his life and theory can be understood through the lens of his 
relationship with Sigmund Freud. That relationship is closely scrutinized in the following 
historical examination. The second paper broadens this examination and studies its long -
range impact on the theoretical canon, seeking to examine the steps that have taken us
from the initially distant and non-mutual psychotherapeutic relationship to the more 
egalitarian and co-created format in which many clinicians are working today. Love, as a 
central concept and tenet of psychotherapy, is examined in both its absence and presence 
over the course of the history of psychoanalysis. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
There are many reasons not to discuss or study the reality of non-erotic love n the 
psychotherapeutic relationship. These include conceptual struggles around the actual 
meaning of “non-erotic love”; linguistic difficulties that are a byproduct of the evocative 
tenor of the word “love” itself; and the considerable menacing nature of researching a 
concept that is nearly defined by its subjective nature. Perhaps, though, the most powerful 
reason to avoid the complicated presence of love in the therapeutic relationship is the 
very reason it must be deeply understood and scrutinized: it is an ethical minefield.  
When I first began studying love in psychotherapy, it was in direct response to 
recognizing what had felt unspeakable to me as a patient in my long-term psychotherapy. 
In a relationship in which I had carte blanche to what ought to be say-able, the 
underlying emotional frame of the relationship went unnamed. Eleven years into this 
transformative treatment, as a therapist in training myself, I was astonished by the 
unbelievable collusion with which my therapist and I danced away from the word “love”.  
My initial work was driven by a wish to take this love out of hiding, for my own 
therapy and in the treatment of others. Blind, perhaps, to the substantial risks associated 
with this possible admission, I initiated this research self-righteously. That is to say, with 
the “answers”. Love had been unfairly and systematically erased from clinical discourse 
and it needed a fierce and powerful reintroduction. After several years as  therapist 
myself, I have backed down a bit. This is largely because I started to very much love a 
client.  
Originally, my work was held together by a fantasy scaffolding: love can be 
understood in discrete terms. These headings included: non-erotic love and erotic love. I 
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now realize that this scaffolding does not exist. Instead, love (on the part of the therapist) 
is a deconstruction of how we think of our professional, boundaried selves. In order not 
to fall apart completely in the face of it, we are required to attend to an unscathi g level 
of honesty and self-awareness. This must occur in order for love, in psychotherapy, to be 
managed healthfully, rather than to the detriment of the client. 
For me, loving a client was at once exhilarating and terrifying. That is becaus  
love is often both. However, allowing for the reality that a client had penetrated my 
psyche beyond my office, beyond my supervision and beyond my psychological 
professional frame, created a tremendous disruption in my sense of self and balance. I 
frequently dreamed of my client, wished for her to become a central member of my 
immediate family, and fantasized about seeing a movie together. While these images 
might seem benign because of the overt absence of sexual content, the actual space that 
they took in my mind was of sincere discomfort to me.  
My initial wish in studying the possibly curative benefits of love in psychotherapy 
was to encourage therapists to not only permissively feel love, but also to admit it to 
clients who would be helped by this admission. Now, several years later, my certainty has 
dissipated. I have never said “I love you” to a client, and I am not sure if I ever will. This 
does not change my strong conviction that withholding this language is almost as 
complicated as not withholding it. Further, cloaking this reality in linguistic synon ms 
like “care”, “empathy”, “the therapeutic alliance”, or “countertransference” is a decision 
which, while potentially wise, must be carefully interrogated for its acual intent. Do we 
describe love instead of saying “love” in order to protect ourselves, or our clients? And 
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what about our clients who have never been told that they are loved? Is our withholding a 
reenactment or an obvious attendance to the professional frame? Perhaps it is both.  
Having now taught hundreds of social work students, completing both my 
Master’s and Doctoral levels of Social Work education, I have arrived at some decisions 
which do support not necessarily the admittance of love, but the absolute necessity for 
researching it, and the treatment of this phenomenon throughout history. I can not recount 
the number of papers that I have read from students that mention their 
countertransferential feelings and their plans to rid themselves of them. While in some 
echelons of our field, namely psychoanalytic communities, countertransference is 
increasingly welcomed; this does not appear to have trickled down. Similarly, while the 
“real relationship” characterized by an intersubjective nature is currently being embraced 
by some journals and institutes, the notion of having a “real” and potentially loving 
relationship with a client instills terror in young clinicians, who are often taught to adhere 
to evidence based and measurable technique.  
Ironically, it is precisely our less seasoned clinicians who deserve to be 
indoctrinated into the complex reality and nuanced experience that accompanies our 
work. We work, more times than not, in the murky realm of grayness that defies simple
“right” or “wrong” answers. Manualized treatments seek to convince otherwise, but the 
tolerance for ambiguity that practicing psychotherapy requires, particul ly when it is 
coupled with love, must also be a technique with which we equip members of our field. 
I can recall a case presentation in a Master’s level class that I was teaching. A 
student was discussing a client who was chronically suicidal. She discussed feeling a 
sense of collegiality with the client and during her presentation, when examining her 
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fears about the client’s mental well-being, she cried. Given the safe environment of the 
classroom, this was dealt with sensitively by the students and there was a lot of mention 
of how “okay” it was to cry. It was, indeed, okay. However, when I met with the student 
outside of class, she reflected on this public and emotional outpouring, and was unable to 
adequately trace the trajectory of her feelings. She remained mired in a profound struggle 
with shame while discussing the intensity of feelings she had for her client. I suggested 
the possibility that she was feeling a level of vulnerability consistently au hored by 
presence of love. The profound and immediate relief that accompanied my naming of this 
possibility shifted the conversation in a way that only an utterance of truth can.  
It is the utterance of the truth of love and its pervasive presence in our work that I 
am examining in this dissertation. It is my sincere belief that this is a dialogue that ought 
to take place in the exact field of social work. A field founded on the curative nature of 
the human relationship and the dismantling of hierarchical power structures, must also 
examine the curative nature of every element of this relationship.  Love is one of these 
essential elements. We also work with populations that are historically underserved, 
oppressed and placed on the periphery of services that make living a sustainable life 
possible. What we neglect to say about these populations, however, is that they are 
frequently unloved. Many of our clients have gone most of their lives deprived of love. 
With this in mind, we must also recognize that social work is a field which seeksto nd 
oppression, even in this form; this renders the research all the more important.  
Understanding how to master our loving feelings towards clients, developing 
theory that informs technique on how to manage love, and realizing its curative potential 
is the work of social work. According to Lear, “Freud’s revolution contained three relat d 
 11
elements who significance we have only begun to understand: a science of subjectivity; 
the discovery of an archaic form of mental functioning; the positing of Love as a basic 
force in nature” (1990, 3).  Freud did indeed recognize the centrality of love to the human 
existence. However, he also worked to practice free of what he perceived as the dilutive 
nature of love in psychotherapy. When urged, by Sandor Ferenczi, one of his analysands, 
to interrogate his beliefs on the role of love in treatment, Freud rejected Ferenczi. This 
rejection was followed by both a characterological and conceptual assassination of 
Ferenczi and relational love respectively, that impacts our thinking today. Whilemany of 
the nuances of the therapeutic relationship have been unveiled over time, the same cannot 
be said of love. 
This dissertation is not positioned at the point in the dialogue where I know what 
the goal or mutative realities of psychotherapeutic love are. Instead, I seek to stablish its 
longstanding presence and subsequent demonization in the literature. My hope is to 
normalize its presence. This goal is both minimal and lofty. While I do believe that 
technique and theory around therapeutic love is of absolute necessity, I conceive of this 
dissertation as the precursor to those crucial next steps.  
The central goals and implications of this precursor are multi-faceted. The first is
an in-depth elucidation of the role that psychoanalytic theory has had upon social work. 
While this is not a link that is often made transparent, the imprint of early psychoanalysis 
deeply informs the way that social work is both practiced and taught today. However, this 
lack of transparency renders social work ill-equipped to truly deconstruct its own 
underpinnings.  By tracing the historical trajectory of how the therapeutic relationship has 
been conceived of overtime, a proper questioning and reconsideration take place. The 
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underlying premise of social work, which is that “the relationship heals”, needs to be 
revisited for its actual meaning. What is the relationship? What is it compromised of? Are 
love and relationships inextricably linked? And, if so, is social work and love inextricably 
link. I believe that they are. Given this conviction, the following papers seek to dismantle 
to opacity of the admonition of love in psychotherapy and to reveal the utter importance 
of introducing this reality to various crevices of our field: supervision, education and 
practice. I argue that the lack of awareness of love is destructive to our work and to the 
students of our field. I ultimately conclude that without recognizing the whole of the 
affective therapeutic relationships, for clinicians, requires us to practice wi h one 
proverbial arm behind our back. The simple realization of love and ideally and a call for 
theory creation on how to harness its curative nature are the principal findings of the e 
papers. 
The following dissertation follows the “two-paper structure”. The individual 
papers are in different phases of the publication process. “Sandor Ferenczi: A Life Lived 
Dyadically ” was published in Psychoanalytic Social Work, 17(1), January-June 2010. “A 
Historical Examination of Love Within the Psychotherapeutic Relationship” has been 
submitted for a third round of revisions to the Clinical Social Work Journal. The 
dissertation contains these two articles; and includes an in-depth introduction and 
conclusion linking the two pieces. 
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SANDOR FERENCZI: A LIFE LIVED DYADICALLY 
 
Introduction 
 
Sandor Ferenczi (1873-1933) argued against the existence of objective truth. 
Appropriately, the writings about him are deeply split and difficult to sift through, 
offering almost no consistent information on his life or perspectives on his work. Even 
Ferenczi’s original texts (produced by Ferenczi), are still incomplete, and lack the robust 
critical commentary that accompanies most psychoanalytic writing today.  
Ferenczi saw the self as knowable only in the context of relationships and 
believed that truth is elusive. He welcomed the use of countransferential feelings within 
the psychotherapeutic dyad.  He was interested in the most efficacious form of treatment, 
always focusing on what was empirically curative. A century later, evidence-based 
practice and health maintenance organizations are raising similar issues regarding 
psychoanalysis. Not only is the study of Ferenczi’s life currently relevant, his life and 
clinical work also lend insight into the political history of psychoanalytic thougt, the 
political undercurrents of the analytic world, and ultimately, the power that early 
childhood experiences have in shaping each person’s interpersonal and professional life.  
Ferenczi would likely consider the struggle to find anything un-opinionated about 
him a worthy piece of data regarding both his life and the complicated world of 
psychoanalytic thought. He would not be surprised to learn that it is difficult to find 
information on him as a practitioner, distinct from his colleague and long time mentor, 
Sigmund Freud. Almost as if he were an appendage of Freud’s intellect—sometimes 
dissident, sometimes cooperative—Ferenczi is most often understood through the lens of 
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Freud’s life and work. In this paper, I will examine the impact Ferenczi’s relationship 
with Freud had on his theories about personality, trauma, and the clinical relationship.  
Almost a century ago, Sandor Ferenczi initiated a conversation about a central 
and potentially curative tenet of the psychotherapeutic relationship: authenticity. He 
introduced the idea that love, mutuality, and authenticity frequently exist between 
therapist and patient, an idea that is gaining credence and momentum in both relational 
and intersubjective thought movements today.  Well ahead of his time, Ferenczi saw the
treatment relationship as a home for egalitarian relatedness, profound honesty, a d the 
rewriting of traumatic pasts. He believed this rewriting could occur only if the analyst 
offered authenticity and love to the analysand.  
Ferenczi’s childhood and family relationships, and ultimately his analytic 
training, led to the development of his theory of the mutuality between patient and 
analyst. That theory clearly provides the framework for the interpersonal, relational, and 
intersubjective theories currently gaining credibility. Although it takes some excavation 
to truly understand Ferenczi’s work, paying tribute to the framework he created is crucial 
to grasping these schools of thought. 
     Freud and Ferenczi 
 Ferenczi first showed interest in Freud in 1907 in a letter requesting a meeting. 
They began to correspond in 1908 and stayed in extremely close contact, writing 526 
letters to each other between1908 and 1914 (Haynal, 2005). Information on their complex 
relationship has only become available recently with the publication of the first eleven 
years of their correspondence (Berman, 1997). While Ferenczi began as a pupil of 
Freud’s, became his analysand, and was one of his confidantes, he also became the first 
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theorist to provide a worthy alternative to Freud’s theory of development and treatment 
(Berman, 1997, Lothane, 1998). 
 Ferenczi and Freud met for the first time on February 2, 1908 (Aron, 1998). From 
the moment of their initial encounter, they became close friends. This first meeting was 
soon followed by a pattern of traveling together every summer. During one of those trips, 
three years following their first meeting, one of several documented conflicts arose 
between the two men. While some readings of this conflict paint Ferenczi as desperate 
and excessively neurotic (Tabin, 1995), more recent interpretations see the men through a 
different lens (Aron, 1998). The disagreement started as Freud and Ferenczi were 
collaborating on a case they were to present together. Ferenczi became extremely agitated 
and angry because Freud merely dictated the text to him, instead of collaborating (Aron, 
1998). When Ferenczi attempted to confront Freud about the issue, Freud suggested that 
Ferenczi was being childish. 
 Even eleven years after this formative relational event, Ferenczi continued o 
analyze his own response to Freud in letters to colleagues (Aron, 1998). Ferenczi was 
quoted as saying, “Freud was too big for me, too much of a father. The result was that in 
Palermo, where he wanted to do the famous work on paranoia in collaboration with me, 
right on the first event of work, when he wanted to dictate something to me, I rose up in a 
sudden burst of rebellion and explained that it was not at all a collaboration” (Brabant, 
Falzeder, & Giampieri-Deutsch, 1993, 214-215, found in Aron, 1998, p. 7). Ernest Jones, 
a biographer of Ferenczi’s, who ultimately wrote very sourly about him, interpretd his 
response to Freud as a “quite inordinate and insatiable longing for his father’s lov ” 
(Jones, 1955, found in Lothane, 1998, p. 35). Judith Dupont, the editor of Ferenczi’s 
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Clinical Diary, offers a different perspective.  According to Aron (1998), Dupont thought 
Ferenczi’s indignant response conveyed “a much more independent attitude than Freud 
was prepared to accept . . . Ferenczi felt that he had cause to reproach Freud for an 
attitude of paternal severity and reserve, while Freud reproached Ferenczi for behaving 
like a truculent and demanding child” (p. 8). Among the relevant literature, this episod  is 
viewed as a harbinger of their future interpersonal struggles (Aron, 1998; Berman, 2001; 
Haynal, 2005).  
 Steeped in their complex dynamic, Ferenczi entered what is termed the informal 
phase of his analysis with Freud, which took place mainly through letter writing. These 
correspondences predated their brief formal analysis by several years. In n attempt at 
full self-disclosure, Ferenczi revealed that during this time that he was struggling with 
“resistances against my own homosexual drive components” (cited in Aron, 1998, p. 9).  
Ferenczi became more and more frustrated with Freud’s withholding response, repeatedly 
striving for mutual openness. The following excerpt from a letter from Ferenczi to Freud 
captures this wish: 
It is not correct that I have always sought out only the great scholar in you—and 
was disappointed by the realization of human weaknesses . . . What made me 
inhibited and taciturn . . . [was that] I was longing for personal, uninhibited 
cheerful companionship with you (and I can be cheerful, indeed, boisterously 
cheerful), and I felt—perhaps unjustifiably—forced back into the infantile role. 
To be sure, I did, perhaps, have an exaggerated idea of companionship between 
two men who tell each other the truth unrelentingly, sacrificing all consideration. I 
strive for absolute mutual openness . . . I believe that this, apparently cruel but in 
the end only useful, clear-as-day openness, which conceals nothing, could be 
possible in relations between two psychoanalytically minded people . . . That was 
the ideal I was looking for: I wanted to enjoy the man, not the scholar, in close 
friendship. (Ferenczi to Freud, October 3, 1910 found in Rachman, 2007, p. 83) 
 
Freud was not able to reciprocate as Ferenczi had hoped. Freud had described his 
ethic in the nineteenth century and remained loyal to it in the face of Ferenczi’s continued 
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requests for mutuality. He saw himself as one who works to the best of one’s power, as 
an elucidator, as a teacher, as the representative of a freer or superior view f th  orld, 
as a father confessor who gives absolution, as it were by continuance of his sympathy and 
respect after the confession has been made. (Freud, 1895, p. 282-283 found in Lothane, 
1998, p. 24) 
These distinct viewpoints led to the development of divergent theories that further 
divided the two men. Their theories deviated in two central ways—one more theoretical 
in nature and the second related to practice. Having been reprimanded by the 
psychoanalytic community for believing children’s accounts of incest and sexual abuse, 
Freud began to interpret children’s accounts of sexual abuse as the byproducts of their 
internal drives and imaginations. He believed it was a child’s own guilt and remorse 
about early sexual longings that ultimately arrested his/her development, if not properly 
resolved. Ferenczi, on the other hand, believed that children’s accounts of incest and 
early childhood sexual abuse conveyed memories of actual events.  It’s likely that he 
believed children’s accounts because he was a survivor of sexual abuse and understood 
the profound impact it had on his own psychological functioning. This perspective 
informed almost all of his clinical thinking, and may well have led to his marginalization 
as a valued member of the psychoanalytic community.  More importantly, perhaps, this 
controversy also sheds light on the important theoretical and practice differences among 
Ferenczi’s contemporaries.  
Freud understood conflict as an intrapsychic struggle that could be resolved in a 
withholding treatment environment. He thought that withholding or “abstinence” (Aron, 
1998) would create the space necessary for an analysand to free associate and thereby 
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reveal the unconscious processes leading to unhappiness and neurotic inhibition. 
Conversely, Ferenczi saw intrapsychic conflict as the direct product of interpersonal 
relationships. He believed that intrapsychic conflict could only be resolved in the context 
of a new, healing relationship. For Ferenczi, “the adult wish for personal contact a d 
relatedness . . . should not be reduced to its genetic origins in infantile longings” (Aron,
1998, p. 11). This theoretical difference shaped Freud’s and Ferenczi’s respective 
searches for truth; “truth in relationship and truth intrapsychically” (Aron, 1998, p. 13). 
Ferenczi “emphasized emotions vs. ideas, external trauma vs. internal drives, and dyadic 
concepts vs. monadic models of symptom formation” (Lothane, 1998, p. 26).  
Freud and Ferenczi certainly agreed that unconscious longings needed to be 
expressed and that insight was curative; however, their perceptions about the modes by 
which the unconscious could be reached and treated were very different. “Ferenczi [like 
Freud] idealistically argued that once people really understood the workings of their 
unconscious minds their worldviews would undergo significant modifications” (Aron, 
1998, p. 11). Their divergence is seen in Ferenczi’s description of the true goal of (this) 
insight: 
The final consequence of such insight—when it is present in two people—is that 
they are not ashamed in front of each other, keep nothing secret, tell each other 
the truth without risk of insult or in the certain hope that within the truth there can 
be no lasting insult. (Ferenczi, found in Aron, 1998, p. 11)  
 
This inherent distinction in their beliefs regarding the relative importance of intrapsychic 
dynamics on the one hand, and interpersonal longing and healing on the other mapped the 
remaining years of struggle that would intensify between Freud and Ferenczi. 
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 Along with these viewpoints, Ferenczi’s own experience as Freud’s analysd led 
to the crystallization of their different techniques and theories. Ferenczi grew frustrated 
with Freud’s call for “sterility,” self-discipline, and a therapeutic dyad defined by a clear 
hierarchy of analyst over analysand. Instead, Ferenczi encouraged “enthusiasm about 
equality, openness, and mutuality, about blurring boundaries, transcending hierarchies, 
and sharing knowledge freely” (Berman, 1997, p. 185). Ferenczi found Freud’s ideals 
unrealistic, and in fact used his own frustration as a yardstick with which to measure (his 
assessment of) his mentor’s limitations.  
 Ferenczi’s analysis with Freud took place during three short periods between 
1914 and 1916. Freud viewed his treatment with Ferenczi as hugely successful, in that 
Ferenczi was able to achieve Freud’s two central treatment goals: to love and to work. He 
portrayed the treatment as having a “completely successful” result because Ferenczi 
“married the women he loved and turned into a friend and teacher of his supposed rivals” 
(Freud, 1937, found in Rudnytsky, 1996, p. 7).  
 Ferenczi disagreed. Ferenczi’s marriage was a constant source of conflict and 
unhappiness, as he remained in love with two women. Further, he felt that his sessions 
with Freud had never adequately addressed his negative transference towards Freud, even 
after repeated attempts on Ferenczi’s part to initiate this important conversation. Ferenczi 
continued to revisit the Palermo incident, urging Freud to examine his own negative 
contribution to the experience. From Ferenczi’s perspective, the more he revealed hims lf 
in treatment or in letters, whether through disclosing his homosexual longings or 
expressing his wish that Freud would study his own countertransference, the more he was 
repudiated.  
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 But Freud was unable to relate these questions and longings to the growing 
distance between them. For many years, “Freud . . . assert[ed] that his relationship with 
Ferenczi ‘remained unclouded,’ until for ‘… no assignable external reason,’ trouble 
arose” (Rudnytsky, 1996, p. 6). Despite Freud’s continued denial, Ferenczi gained the 
courage to ask Freud to enter analysis with him. Ferenczi reveals this impasioned wish 
in the following excerpt: 
Perhaps this is the occasion on which I can say to you that I actually find it to be 
tragic that you, who gave analysis to the world, find it so difficult—indeed are not 
in a position—to entrust yourself to someone (Ferenczi to Freud, February 26, 
1926, quoted by Aron, 1998, p. 14). 
 
Freud was indignant, convinced “… he no longer had any need or motive to open himself 
up to another” (Aron, 1998, p. 12). He disparaged Ferenczi’s character and longings in 
letters to his peers, although he did not describe to Ferenczi the true intensity of his 
discomfort. Freud privately described Ferenczi to a colleague as a “dear fellow . . . 
dreamy in a disturbing kind of way, [whose] attitude towards me is infantile” (Aron, 
1998, p. 12). Having received no validation from Freud, Ferenczi sought to cure himself 
by validating the experiences of his own patients. “What Ferenczi as analysd 
expect[ed] from Freud, the master psychoanalyst, is precisely what he some tw  d cades 
later attempted to offer his own patients: mutual openness and honesty” (Aron, 1998, p. 
10). 
 It was with a fervor for mutuality that Ferenczi ultimately struck out on his own, 
seeking to build a theory and practice based on his own experience of what was curative. 
In 1927, he was invited to New York to lecture at the New School for Social Research, 
where his ideas had gained some prominence. Simultaneously, Freud was growing more 
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and more uncomfortable with Ferenczi’s commitment to mutuality and, perhaps more 
significantly, with his independence. Freud had little tolerance for geographical 
separation, particularly with regard to Ferenczi’s “desertions” to the USA (Haynal, 2005, 
p. 459). But after reluctantly accepting Freud’s refusal to enter mutual analysis with him, 
Ferenczi felt he needed to take the trip to the United States. “Freud was anything but 
enthusiastic about Ferenczi’s travel plans: ‘I can only hope that this journey will not 
signify the disappointment that some predict’” (Freud to Ferenczi, 6 June 1926, p. 260, 
found in Haynal, 459). Ferenczi saw it as “… a time of weaning for me and my wife” 
(Ferenczi to Freud, 30 May 1926, found in Haynal, p. 459).  
 Freud and Ferenczi’s correspondence dried up during these years. In his diary, 
Ferenczi reflected on his one-time mentor’s coolness, rejection, and hostility. For his part, 
Freud exaggerated Ferenczi’s treatment approach in a particular case and ridiculed him 
for kissing patients. In a rare moment of professional confidence, Ferenczi refused to 
defend himself against Freud’s allegations (Haynal, 2005). 
 It was at Freud and Ferenczi’s final meeting, in 1932, that the relationship 
completely fell apart. When Freud urged him not to deliver his definitive work, “A 
Confusion of Tongues,” Ferenczi was shocked by the disapproval. Freud described the 
paper as “harmless and dumb,” (Tabin, p. 312), and viewed it as a step backward after 
years of achievement. He later wrote in Ferenczi’s obituary.  
 In 1933, Ferenczi died as he had lived, plagued by an abiding sense that Freud 
disapproved of him. While closely scrutinizing Ferenczi’s life through the lens of hi 
relationship with Freud might seem an affront to Ferenczi’s individual achievements, it 
does, in fact pay homage to his conviction that the self is knowable only in relationship. It 
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is likely that Ferenczi would think that trying to understand his life through an 
interpersonal prism is a worthy choice. 
 
 
Ferenczi’s Quest for Mutuality 
 Examinations of Ferenczi’s theory of development and treatment only came into 
vogue in the last 20 years. Sensing early in his career that complex symptom analysis, 
which focused on details, was outmoded and ineffective, Ferenczi replaced that practice 
by focusing on the relationship in the therapy room, studying it closely as it evolved. He 
came to believe that the therapeutic relationship was the key to emotional health, and that 
authentic emotion within it was vital: “The essential healing power in the therapeutic gift 
is love” (DeForest, 1955, p. 6). Now, in the twenty-first century, the love Ferenczi 
advocated is finally finding its way into therapeutic discourse. Ferenczi’s pioneering 
espousal of its importance was almost a foreshadowing of our present moment. 
 Ferenczi believed that compromised psychological functioning was a direct 
byproduct of relational failures that occur as a result of early childhood trauma. In his 
paper “Confusion of Tongues” he introduced the central concept that trauma is induced 
by a child’s seduction at the hands of a parent or other authority figure. He felt that 
children are born with a sexual innocence that is corrupted by “overstimulation of erotic 
impulses by the parent’s need to satisfy his/her sexual desires with the child” (Rachman, 
2007, p. 82). Accordingly, the child’s drive for attachment and affection is misunderstood 
as lust. Driven by sexual desire, the adult then tries to convince the child that an erotic 
encounter is what the child truly wants, thereby confusing the child’s developing sense of 
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self (Rachman, 2007). Ferenczi broadened his concept of sexual abuse to include 
emotional neglect, physical assault, and failures in empathy. According to Ferenczi, the 
need for a primary love object is an elemental longing on the part of the child, and is the 
formative building block of personality. Defenses—including denial, dissociation, 
detachment, and splitting—evolve in response to these neglected longings. Ferenczi 
posited that, in the face of persistent trauma, personality fragmentation will eventually 
present itself.  
 Ferenczi’s method was designed over a period of twenty years, in direct respons  
to his belief in the pervasiveness of childhood trauma. He developed a technique based 
on the conviction that the analyst’s responses are a valuable source of clinical 
information. He believed that both his countertransference and his real feelings that had 
evolved for Freud needed to be studied, discussed, and honored, and he generalized that 
belief in working with patients. He urged analysts to develop a metapsychology that 
would conceptualize their own process and to make use of their internal responses in the 
moment (Cabre, 1998, p. 247)—the more difficult the case, the more important the 
moment-by-moment data. In fact, Ferenczi became known as the analyst of “last resort” 
(Rachman, p. 79) because he unconditionally believed that empathy is curative.  He also
believed that a withholding stance recreates trauma, while empathy ameliorates t. 
“Ferenczi was the first clinician to discover an essential truth about the psychoanalytic 
situation; that is to say, that the empathic response is the core of clinical inter ction” 
(Rachman, p. 79). 
 Ferenczi created an analytic setting antithetical to the one he experienced with 
Freud; he gave the patient’s experiences a sense of credibility that had been abs nt from 
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their lives until the treatment relationship. He described this setting to his friend DeForest 
(1955).  She relays it as follows: 
The setting free of his [the patient’s] critical feelings, the willingness on our part 
to admit our mistakes and the honest endeavor to avoid them in the future, all 
these go to create in the patient a confidence in the analyst. It is this confidence 
that establishes the contrast between the present and the unbearable traumatogenic 
past, the contrast which is absolutely necessary for the patient in order to enable 
him to re-experience the past no longer as a hallucinatory reproduction but as an 
object memory. (p. 13) 
 
The end goal of this openness was personality cohesion, which Ferenczi saw as the 
definitive outcome of a successful treatment. Only by recognizing the analys d as an 
equally intelligent and valued partner in the treatment relationship could true cohesion 
develop (Rachman, 2007). 
 In treatment and in life, Ferenczi was committed to equality, which for him began 
as a political conviction. He refused to pathologize women, homosexuals, and individuals 
from other classes. “Ferenczi fought to protect homosexual patients from oppression 
before the Humanitarian Scientific Committee in Berlin . . . He defended the status of the 
medical assistants who were exploited and then dismissed. He pressed for higher salaries, 
better working conditions, and proper training. Ferenczi’s political commitment was 
tenacious” (Moreau-Ricaud, 1996, p. 46).  He felt comfortable using himself as a 
maternal or paternal object, and was open to constant fluidity in the different roles he 
played within the treatment relationship. As the pioneer of relational therapy, he 
ultimately came to view treatment as form of equality, and advocated for mutual analysis, 
hoping that “the tears of doctor and patient mingle in a sublimated communion, which 
perhaps finds its analogy only in the mother-child relationship” (Cabre, 1998, p. 252).   
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Ferenczi’s unorthodox clinical discourse set the stage for the development of 
relational psychoanalysis. It is within the relational model that conversation  about 
authentic therapeutic love have finally begun to re-emerge. According to Baur (1997), 
relational therapy can be defined as “… the attempt to place therapist and patient on far 
more equal footing than conventional therapies, and it emphasizes the curative power of 
the relationship that develops between them” (p. 222).  Baur further suggests that 
Ferenczi’s theories are the inspiration for relational therapy, stating that his “ideas on 
mutual analysis and on the real relationship that develops in spite of a clinician’s 
professional stance are more in vogue now than in his lifetime” (p. 222). Stanton (1991) 
explains Ferenczi’s convictions in the following passage: 
Patients expected something else from analysts, something that would nurtureand 
perhaps heal them . . . This “something else” Ferenczi called “love.” 
Psychoanalytic cure, Ferenczi explained, is in direct proportion to the cherishing 
love given by the psychoanalyst to the patient; the love which the psychoneurotic 
patient needs [emphasis in the original], not necessarily the love which he thinks 
he needs and therefore demands. (p. 138-139)  
 
The belief in authentic love between therapist and patient is, at long last, coming 
into vogue. In the wake of Freud’s argument that the central goals of therapy are to 
enable the patient to work and love, it seems that the therapeutic relationship, as Ferenczi 
suspected, is the place to start.     
Ferenczi: Stifled and a  Shunned 
 Sigmund Freud shunned Ferenczi’s attempts to humanize the therapeutic 
relationship.  According to Cabre (1998), this led to “one of the most remarkable 
processes of censorship in the history of psychoanalysis . . . Ferenczi’s ideas wer  
forgotten [emphasis in the original] and condemned to silence” (p. 247). Thus, the idea of 
therapeutic love disappeared from the theoretical discourse for decades.  
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 When Ferenczi’s ideas were rejected, his contributions to the usefulness of 
countertransference and therapeutic love were also lost. In an address given in Th  Hague 
in the early twentieth century, Ferenczi expressed his belief that “[t]he progress of the 
cure bears no relation to the depth of the patient’s theoretical insight, nor to the memories 
laid bare” (Stanton, 1991, p. 133). Instead, Ferenczi’s method was “developed to the 
fullest when he recognized that genuine sincerity and empathic attunement were the 
essential ingredients to reach a traumatized individual” (Rachman, 1998, p. 265).  
Ferenczi “maintained that no progress whatsoever is likely to be made in psychoanalysis 
unless we surrender defense through distance” (Stanton, 1991; p. 136). While Freud 
considered distance to be a necessary therapeutic technique, Ferenczi viewed it as a 
defense. In contrast, Ferenczi encouraged patients to resist blind obedience in the 
therapeutic situation. He stated that obedience was what had oppressed patients as 
children, and that obedient patients in particular required a more tender approach. This 
call for tenderness may ultimately have led to Ferenczi’s professional marginalization.  
 Ferenczi continued to insist that incest did take place in middle and upper class 
communities. He presented this claim most clearly in his last lecture, “Confusion of 
Tongues.” As Rachman (2007) noted, “Ferenczi’s sense that incest was regularly 
occurring in middle and upper class families was considered by the traditional analytic 
community as absurd” (p. 83). 
Arguing that Ferenczi became obsessed with differentiating his beliefs from 
Freud’s, Eros (2007) writes that within the mainstream psychoanalytic movement most 
analysts believed that: “Ferenczi was, at the end of his life, mentally disturbed, and the 
main symptom of this disturbance was his opposition to Freud” (p. 4).  Fellow analyst 
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Erich Fromm concluded that Ferenczi was the victim of character assassination. Fromm 
argued that Ferenczi’s professional erasure from the psychoanalytic community could be 
compared to a “Stalinist rewriting of history.” Fromm described a time dominated by a 
worship of Freud, in which dissidents were labeled betrayers, spies, or as mentally ill. 
According to Fromm, “ . . . the totalitarian turn in the psychoanalytic movement, which is 
dominated by a closed circle of sectarian functionaries, is not so different from he 
Central Committee of a Communist party” (Eros, 4, 2007).   The actual state of mind at 
the end Ferenczi’s life is certainly debatable and remains a point of dispute. Jones (1994) 
terms him as “mentally ill” given his death at the hands of pernicious anemia. While it is 
unclear of what impact of this illness was on his psyche, his final presentation suggested 
the presence of a clear and functioning mind. Ferenczi, however, was aware of and 
prepared for the character assassination that was launched by his contemporaris. He 
used his therapeutic acuity to interpret and manage it: 
Ferenczi . . . was becoming increasingly aware of the paranoia surrounding him. 
As long ago as 1910 he had recognized “the excrescences that grow from 
organized groups”—such as the International Psychoanalytical Association, in 
whose formation he himself had been involved—and he knew “that in most 
political, social and scientific organizations childish megalomania, vanity, 
admiration of empty formalities, blind obedience, or personal egoism prevail 
instead of quiet, honest work in the general interest.” (Aron, 1998, p. 18) 
 
 The source of Ferenczi’s censorship was clearly multifaceted, largely a byproduct 
of his time. Not only did he challenge Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, but 
by acknowledging the existence of incest, he also affronted the purported mental heal h 
of the community in which he worked.  Ferenczi’s challenge to Freud came at a time 
when Freud was thinking about his own mortality and considering who he would choose 
to succeed him. The more Ferenczi grew apart from him, this more Freud rejected him as 
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a possible successor. Ferenczi was looking for a father and Freud was looking for a son; 
neither found exactly what he was looking for. Freud could not handle differentiation or 
rejection, and Ferenczi became more and more frustrated in the face of Freud’s 
unflappability and possessiveness. While some pairings are strong enough to withstand 
individuation, this one was not.  
 Unfortunately, the psychoanalytic community as a whole suffered a great loss 
because of the Ferenczi - Freud split. Indeed, “it was sometimes as if Ferenczi had never 
written what he wrote; and in some places he simply did not exist” (Haynal, p. 463). This 
tide has turned quickly, though, and Ferenczi’s ostracization is coming to an end. He is 
now recognized, even honored, for his innovations and his writings influence practice 
throughout the world. He is credited with influencing several contemporary therapeutic 
models, including those built on relational, interpersonal and intersubjective theories. 
Borgogno (2004), an Italian analyst, begs his colleagues to end their complicated, long-
standing political resistance to Ferenczi. 
To let Ferenczi interrogate ourselves could perhaps help us to reinvigorate our 
internal cohesion and our group identity, and furthermore, to cope more 
courageously and humbly with the disorientation created by the multiplicity of 
our models and some of the problems and consequences of the crisis our 
tumultuous and changing society is facing. Let us be interrogated by his genial 
intuition and audacious openness, by his honesty and determination in moving 
forward our specific mandate, and in employing every conceivable means to 
approach the patient’s “subjective truth” by all that he did in that foundation 
moment of psychoanalysis. (Borgogno, 2004, p. 6) 
 
 To study Ferenczi without access to his theories is to perform research in the dark. 
While researchers struggle to find objective information on him, he repeatedly reminds 
his readers that truth is subjective. When we are troubled by the mystery of his 
disappearance from the psychoanalytic canon his writings remind us of the power gr ups
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have to deny what frightens them, and of their tendency to resort to hierarchical 
functioning in the face of what may for some, be frightening equality. When we wonder 
why his biography is so deeply intermingled with Freud’s, we remember that for 
Ferenczi, the self existed only relationally; he would have wanted us to study him in
precisely such a context.  Ferenczi’s theories guide us through psychotherapeutic 
impasses, urge us to revise our mistakes, and remind us to examine his life with both 
curiosity and tenderness. 
 However, this curiosity and tenderness must be tempered with a sense of caution. 
There is ample proof of Ferenczi’s propensity to bend the “frame” beyond a point that 
today would be considered ethical. He does describe falling in love with one of his 
patients and was rightfully challenged, by Freud, for kissing patients. The issu s of 
psychotherapeutic love and mutuality are possibly two very distinct concepts, mistakenly 
co-mingled by Ferenczi. While over time the presence of love in the psychotherapeutic 
relationship has gained capital, the appropriate management of it must still fall within 
strict ethical codes of conduct. Ferenczi requires us to examine him with a sense of 
complexity and nuance, just as he would have us examine our clients. The level of 
vigilance with which we understand him should be no more and no less than we would 
apply to a patient. His theories, given their current resonance and restructuring of archaic 
clinical paradigms, ought to be accorded the same level of respect and consideration 
rather than dismissal over some of their less palatable or controversial elements. 
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A HISTORIC EXAMINATION OF LOVE WITHIN THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC 
DYAD 
Introduction 
 
During any given day of therapy I notice numerous exchanges occurring between 
me and my patients that are inspired by love. To the patient who explains to me the sheer 
joy she feels at having just purchased an Apple computer, I say with complete sinc rity, 
“Tell me more.” I could take the story at face value and leave it that, but I love her, and I 
want to know about the inner workings of this joy, about every facet of her decision to 
make this purchase. If I didn’t feel this way about her, maybe I wouldn’t care as much. 
But I truly do.  
Faced with a patient describing her unbearable grief over the recent suicide of her 
brother, I resist the urge to rush through the session, to move her through the emotion, to 
flee. I don’t. I sit with her in her excruciating pain. She needs me there and I love her, so I 
join her in the depths of her grief. As she speaks of her unbearable grief, I want to hurry 
her through it, but I slow myself down and sit in it with her. I do this out of love.  
During my 3 PM session, a client’s fears about genital warts are bashfully 
revealed. I don’t blink. I don’t budge. I sit, and I listen to the fears, the physical details, 
the panic.  
Most therapists would do these things. It is part of the job, I know. Another part 
of the “job,” however, is a very specific fuel in the tank. To me, this fuel is love. It isn’t 
always love that guides therapists, but the better sessions—the sessions in which I am 
present, engaged, and deeply curious—are usually fueled by a tank full of love. 
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 This is not a love to which I had been exposed in the theoretical discourse that 
informs my practice. I didn’t learn about it in my master’s degree or doctoral-level 
training. For me, it is just implicitly there; it is not present because theory-driven or 
supervised. I believe strongly that the intuition that guides this love and its sharing must 
be crystallized both theoretically and intellectually. As a phenomenon that occurs within 
a professional construct, it is worthy of professional discourse and professional 
guidelines. I hope that the following historical examination will pave the way for this 
discourse by tracing where, as social workers, we have been in relation to the presence of 
love in our field, as well as where we might go. Applegate (2000) asserts that “from its 
inception social work has lived at the edges of the mainstream scientific discourse” 
(Applegate, 130). It is in the spirit of life on the scientific periphery that love must 
become part of our common language.  
In this article I seek to cover the literature that currently exists on the issu  of 
therapeutic love within psychodynamic theory. By love, I refer specifically to a non-
erotic phenomenon, an affectional bond that forms alongside the similar yet distinct 
phenomenon of positive countertransference or countertransferential love. The literature 
will cover varying theoretical understandings of therapeutic love, including differing 
views on its essentialness and pervasiveness. I will offer a description of the historical 
evolution of these various understandings, and will present the research currently 
available on this topic. The data on the topic of non-erotic love in the therapeutic 
relationship is, however, nominal at best. Further, this research is largely basd on the 
personal cases of therapists performing analyses of their own clinical work. While these 
cases are certainly of value, the minute subject size offered by these studies limits their 
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ability to be generalized. In order to compensate for the minimal research performed on 
the topic of non-erotic therapeutic love, I will provide historical perspectiv s on the 
correlative issues of countertransferential erotic love and countertransferential hate, along 
with a more general historical understanding of countertransference and transference. I 
will examine the research of contemporary relational theorists who have only just begun 
to re-conceptualize the potential role and power of therapeutic love. These theorists 
collectively argue for a wider understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of this love 
(Baur, 1997; Bernstein, 2001; Schamess, 1999; Shaw, 2003). Finally, I will present a 
summary of the research supporting this shared argument. 
 
A Paucity of Research 
While Plato introduced the notion of non-erotic or platonic love in the fourth or 
fifth century BCE, the idea’s acknowledgement as a powerful force within psychotherapy 
has been neglected. Plato asserted that platonic love is an abiding, deep, spiritual 
connection that evolves between two individuals. He argued that this love exists without 
any form of sexual connection. Given the seeming benignancy of this concept, it is 
surprising that a longstanding tradition of discouraging loving feelings within the 
therapeutic dyad has held sway. The discouragement of platonic love has resulted in a 
paucity of research on the topic. This is not to say that such love has not existed between 
therapists and their patients; on the contrary, for as long as such love has existed, so too 
has the fear of acknowledging it professionally, whether in research or in supervision. In 
fact, “over its 100-year history, the psychoanalytic literature has rarely considered 
therapists’ loving feelings and fantasies in relation to their patients” (Schamess, 1999, p. 
9). 
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In order to demonstrate the true dearth of research on the issue of therapeutic 
love, it is useful first to trace some of the potential causes for its banishment. Th  
inception of the psychotherapeutic profession can most surely be marked by the case of 
Anna O. With this inception, fears about the love between therapist and patient began to 
take root. This case suggested the need for panic over the possible feelings analysts could 
feel for their analysands. Anne Springer (1992) reveals the intensity of this panic on the 
part of the clinician, Joseph Breuer: 
The first beginnings of our profession are marked by the alarm caused by the 
possibility of the eruption of emotions and feelings in the therapeutic relationship. 
In 1892, Breuer is appalled and breaks off the treatment of Berta Pappenheim 
(Anna O.) when she reveals to him her fantasy of bearing his child—three months 
after Breuer’s wife has given birth to a baby daughter. Breuer’s wife reb ls 
against this close relationship between the patient/rival and her husband. He sees 
his marriage in jeopardy and breaks off all contact with the patient, who is 
subsequently admitted to hospital and withdraws from psychoanalysis. (p. 44) 
 
 While Freud and Breuer worked closely together, it was not until Freud 
experienced his own episode of countertransference that he began to issue stringent 
warnings about its potential destructiveness. In Freud's 1898 piece, “Fragment of an 
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,” he explored the case of Ida Bauer, or “Dora.” Dora was 
the sixteen-year-old daughter of one of Sigmund Freud’s medical patients. Freud worke  
with her in an effort to deconstruct her idealizing relationship with her father. This case 
lasted eleven weeks. “In these eleven weeks, a very close relationship developed” (Freud, 
1898, p. 21).  Springer, who characterizes this relationship as a lengthy discussion about 
love, argues that the examination of Freud’s experience of countertransference p oduced 
a “coming apart” on the part of the analyst. She asserts that Freud’s respons  to his 
countertransferential feeling in this case fell “short of good analytical practice.” She 
describes his behavior in the following passage:   
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When one reads the Dora text again today, one is aware of how insistent Freud 
becomes, particularly in the last sessions before the analysis is broken off, and 
how vigorously he asserts the correctness of his interpretations. He desires
acknowledgement; he wishes to be recognized as a researcher and therapist; and 
most probably as a man too.” (Springer, p. 45) 
 
 Freud’s coming apart or inappropriateness in this case, as described by Springer, lanted 
the seeds for Freud’s eventual declaration of the destructiveness of countertransf ence.  
The strength of Freud’s convictions about countertransference becomes clearer 
upon his consultation on Carl Jung’s work with his patient Sabina Spielrein. Between 
1908 and 1909 Jung began to develop romantic feelings for Spielrein. In writing to Freud 
for supervisory purposes, Jung identifies himself as the “seduced party” (Springer, p. 45). 
Freud’s response follows: 
I myself have never been taken in quite so badly, but I have come very close to it 
a number of times and had a narrow escape. I believe that only grim necessities 
weighing on my world and the fact that I was ten years older than yourself … 
have saved me from similar experiences. But no lasting harm is done. They help 
us to develop the thick skin we need to dominate “countertransference,” which is 
after all a permanent problem for us. (Letters between Jung and Freud, 1910, 44) 
 
 With Freud’s demonization of countertransference, the fear of its comfortable 
recognition, as well as its erasure, was born. This very fear has created a longst nding 
divergence between clinical theory and the exploration of therapeutic love. Over time, 
this divergence has been slowly unraveled through the recognition of various theoretical 
phenomena, beginning with transference and countertransference, moving slowly toward 
an appreciation for the clinical value of countertransference, and culminating in he 
eventual allowance of the possibility for true, loving feelings between therapist and 
client. While Freud’s experience of countertransference was first documented in 1908, 
tools for appropriately managing and making use of it have only recently been discussed. 
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Deborah Coughlin (1998) explains that “despite the significance of the transference-
countertransference dynamic, clinicians have only recently begun to explore and develop 
literature” on therapists’ experiences and feelings towards their clients” (p. 3). Coughlin 
warns that “academic and training programs disregard the significance of erotic 
transference in their curricula, potentially leaving clinicians without the skills and tools to 
effectively manage these issues within their therapeutic dyad” (p. 3). Gerald Schamess 
(1999) also points to significant holes in the research and training on this issue. He 
discovers, after polling classes of MSW students, that many have felt feelings of love 
toward clients, but do not feel comfortable addressing this until Schamess (1999) models
that it is acceptable. He hypothesizes that this dearth of research and material refl cts 
several essential issues. Schamess interprets these issues to be: 
1) Concern that therapists will exploit patients by initiating sexual liaisons; 2) 
difficulties in managing the treatment process when the “frame” has been 
modified to encourage transmuting internalizations; and 3) the danger that needy 
or insecure therapists will unconsciously use patients to meet their own 
narcissistic needs.…  
 
He adds the following caveat: “Ignoring erotic enactment does not make it disappear, and 
paradoxically, markedly increases the likelihood of sexual acting-out or treatment 
failure” (p. 23). 
Susan Baur (1997) elaborates on the discomfort with, and the resulting scarcity of, 
research and writing on therapeutic love felt by the therapist. She initiates her exploration 
at a conference on the feelings that therapists develop for their patients. She offers the 
following anecdotal, yet powerful, observation: 
At a seminar on the feelings that clinicians have for their patients—a weeklong 
affair . . . I made marks in the left-hand margin of my notes every time the word 
“hate” was said and marks in the right-hand margin every time “love” was 
spoken. At the end of five days, [the ratio of hate to love was] forty to one . . . 
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When love for a client was mentioned—not love from a client, but a question such 
as “How did you handle your love for this woman?”—there was silence. (p. 221)  
 
 Baur goes on to hypothesize that the “illogical and deeply emotional forces that underlie 
the [therapeutic] relationship have seemed too close to romantic love to investigate 
safely” (p. 223). She explains that the exploration of these feelings is only sanctified if 
they are framed within the “safety of a parental framework” (p. 222).  Once a therapist 
mentions feelings other than those that mimic a parent-child relationship, she notes, little 
support is available from the clinical community. 
Alex Stirzaker (2000) attempted to formalize Baur’s findings. He sought to prove
empirically, through the compilation of quantitative data, the discomfort that 
accompanies discussing feelings of therapeutic love. Stirzaker (2000) discovered that 
despite the common occurrence of erotic countertransference, “many therapists seemed to 
be reluctant to enter into discussion about both erotic transference and 
countertransference because of the emotive nature of the subject” (p. 198). Given the 
notion that one of the primary tenets of effective therapy is open and honest 
communication, this reluctance is notably counterintuitive. Joan Lesser and Marlene 
Cooper (2002) describe the importance of this tenet. While they pay homage to theory, 
they point out that “theory builds knowledge, and it is this knowledge combined with 
relational authenticity that is the hallmark of clinical . . . practice” (p. 10). Given the 
seeming essentiality of authenticity and realness within the therapeutic dyad, which 
suggests the presence of caring feelings at the least, Stirzaker’s difficulty in finding 
subjects to explore the issue is notable. He sent questionnaires to 107 therapists, “asking 
for comments upon their therapeutic orientation, level of experience, and the length of 
time they had been working with the client concerned” and what their experiences of 
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loving countertransference had been with their particular clients (Stirzaker, 2000, p. 198). 
The 107 subjects selected had varying counseling degrees and worked within both 
agencies and private practices. Only four surveys were returned to the author. He 
subsequently interpreted this to mean that the issue was controversial for clinicians, 
precluding their ability to respond comfortably.    
Daniel Shaw (2003) offers a more in-depth analysis of the absence of literature 
and research on therapeutic love. While arguing for further research into therapeutic love, 
he points out the historical trajectory of the issue’s absence from theoretical discourse. 
The evidence for this absence is provided by examining the writings of Kohut, Freud, 
Balint, and other pivotal clinicians in the history of psychodynamic theory. He writ s that 
each of these theorists examined a considerable number of controversial issues and 
subsequently normalized them. Loving clients, however, was not one of these issue. He 
writes, “. . . my attempt is to facilitate the analytic exploration” of therapeutic, loving 
feelings (Shaw, 2003, 267).  
My goal, which is closely aligned with the attempts of both Shaw and Baur, is to 
uncover the evolution of the theoretical understanding of therapeutic love. I hope this 
exploration will make clear that we are now in a time and place that allows us to look at 
therapeutic love more boldly than Freud and others had hoped we would. Despite his 
brave exploration of transference, Freud is largely responsible for having sile ced an 
important conversation that has only been resumed in the past decade. 
 
Transference 
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It was Freud who first coined the definition of transference as he sought to make 
meaning from this therapeutic phenomenon. In his writings on the theory of 
psychoanalytic technique, Freud offers two different models of transference: 
According to one model, transference is seen primarily as resistance to the 
recovery of memory, and therapeutic gains result chiefly from the retrieval of 
these memories. In the other, transference is largely a result of unconscious 
infantile wishes, and success in therapy results mainly from a complex process in 
which the patient re-experiences these wishes in the transference and realizes th t 
they are significantly determined by pre-existing desires and is then abl to 
experience something new examining them together with the analyst—the one to 
whom these wishes are now directed. (Kirkland-Handley, 1995, p. 49)  
 
To make the definition more accessible, however, Lesser and Cooper (2002) 
define transference as “a displacement of reactions originating with significant persons of 
early childhood” (p. 6). To Freud, the presence of transference made good treatment 
possible. “Freud and his school of classical psychoanalysts began to view transference as 
a source of data, as resistance, and as a battleground for their therapeutic engagement. 
Transference phenomena became an avenue to deepen the therapeutic process and 
provided the therapist with an illustration of the inner workings of the client’s psyche” 
(Coughlin, 1998, p. 5). Freud also sought to make particular sense of the importance of 
erotic transference or loving transference. He argued that the presence of rotic 
transference stems from the activation of past childhood conflicts and fantasies th t are 
difficult to address sufficiently with words (Coughlin, 1998, p. 7). Freud said that 
transference love 
represents a new edition of an old relationship that is superimposed on the 
therapist. While the patient’s feelings of dependency and desire fuel the therapy, 
the neurotic form of the transference relationship itself—the insistence on 
obtaining gratification from the perfect comforter—is the problem that is holding 
the patient back and must be overcome. Good therapy, then, manages to keep the 
transference going to provide impetus for the work that eventually convinces the 
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patient that it is useless to continue looking for perfect providers and protectors. 
(Baur, p. 141)  
 
 
While Freud believed strongly in the curative power of transference, he pleaded 
for the erasure of countertransference, eliminating the possibility for the exploration of 
mutual therapeutic experiences. It was not that Freud did not understand the complexity 
of countertransference—quite the opposite, really. Freud believed that our inner-child 
selves need to accept the frustration linked to a therapist’s attempts to keep the patient at 
an arm’s length. He felt that “if the transference is acted on, and the therapist tried to be 
the perfect partner that the patient hungers for, the patient is likely to repeat all her old 
mistakes and learn nothing” (Baur, p. 142). In other words, “if transference is actd on,” 
the clinician has failed to effectively rid himself or his countertransferential feelings. In a 
letter dated February 20, 1913, Freud offered the following: 
The problem of countertransference is one of the most difficult in psychoanalytic 
technique. What is offered to the patient must never be spontaneous affect; rather 
it must always be expressed consciously. In some circumstances, a lot should be 
offered, but never anything arising directly from the analyst’s unconscious. The 
analyst must always be aware of and overcome the countertransference to be free.
However, at the same time, to give too little to a patient because the analyst loves 
him too much is to confuse him, and is a technical error. It is not easy and practice 
is required. (Freud, Jung letters). 
 
Perhaps useful to note is the fact that Sigmund Freud was trained as a physician. 
Most likely, this background supported his “antiseptic” attitude toward the management 
of countertransference (Rachman, 1998, p.263). Freud called for the analyst’s role to 
mirror that of a surgeon: “An analyst as surgeon suggests expertise, detachment, and 
emotional control . . . Analysts used his technical guidelines to designate non-
interpretative behavior as violating analytic doctrine” (Rachmann, p. 263). Likening the 
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analyst to a surgeon makes clear the message about countertransference. It is believed 
that the more emotionally involved a surgeon becomes, the more at risk the surgery is for 
failure (Rachmann, 1998). Freud believed the same was true of the relationship between 
an analyst’s emotions and the analysis. 
 
Countertransference 
Freud first mentioned the term “countertransference” in 1910, and subsequently 
deemed it to be an “enveloping obstacle that interferes with the analytic work and . . . a 
troublesome difficulty that needs to be controlled through self-analysis” (Rachmann, 
1997, 249). It was not until 1950 that the term reappeared in the writings of Winnicott, 
Racker, and Heimann (Berman, 1997). These theorists, four decades later, were able to 
endorse the importance of an internal, private recognition of countertransference as 
important clinical data (Berman, 1997). In 2001, Arnold Bernstein suggested that while 
countertransference was slowly being deemed useful, limitations existed regarding the 
forms of countertransference that could and could not be discussed. Feelings of hate and 
disdain for clients were more readily acknowledged than loving feelings. He grounds this 
argument by reflecting on the far-reaching impact of Donald Winnicott’s paper “Hate in 
the Countertransference” (Berman, 1997). This paper quickly legitimized the powerful 
experience of hating clients, as well as the multiple ways in which this data could become 
useful in the clinical relationship (Berman, 1997). Winnicott examined the experienc  of 
hating psychotic patients. He writes, "If we are to become able to be the analysts of 
psychotic patients, we must have reached down to very primitive things in ourselves" 
(Winnicott, from "Hate in the Transference," 1947). He goes on to assert that a centr l
primitive force is hate. This hate is normalized by his understanding of the mother-child 
 41
relationship. "I suggest that the mother hates the baby before the baby hates the mother, 
and before the baby can know his mother hates him" (Winnicott, from "Hate in the 
Transference," 1947, 70). Through this normalization of hateful feelings in the sacred 
mother-child dyad, Winnicott legitimized the recognition of a form of 
countertransference. He believed that the feelings between mother and child were most 
certainly mirrored within the therapeutic dyad. If a mother can hate her child, a therapist 
can most certainly hate his or her clients.  
Baur (1997) reveals the present-day impact of Winnicott’s work. Elaborating 
upon Baur’s aforementioned findings derived from the conference on therapists’ feelings 
towards patients, she writes that “when ‘hateful,’ ‘loathsome,’ and ‘detestabl’ came up, 
they triggered a comment or a question roughly three quarters of the time” (Baur, 221). 
This inquisitiveness contrasted greatly with the silence she encountered in respo se to 
discussing love in the context of countertransference.   
While there is a diverse literature exploring the experience of 
countertransferential hate (Berman, 1997), countertransferential love is not given equal or 
even minimal recognition. Shaw (2003) seeks to explain this phenomenon: 
We have long been free to discuss hating our analysands and more recently to 
discuss having sexual feelings for them, including disclosing such feelings. But it 
is less often that we discuss our feelings of tenderness and loving affection for our
analysands, not with the kind of thoughtfulness and seriousness of many of our 
other discussions. Erotic or aggressive countertransferences are now widely 
conferred the status of therapeutic agents . . . Yet case presentations where 
feelings of tenderness and love for an analysand are openly expressed are often 
greeted with suspicion. (p. 253) 
 
It is not that efforts have not been made to fight the pervasive “suspicion” 
associated with countertransferential love. In fact, Sandor Ferenczi introduced the first 
mention of therapeutic love and mutuality in the 1920s (Martin, 1998). Ferenczi was a 
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student of Freud’s for twenty-five years. From 1908 (the day they met) through 1933 
(when Ferenczi died) the two maintained an intense correspondence. This 
correspondence was an impassioned debate about the efficacy of different analytic
stances, specifically the engaged versus the withholding stance. Freud called for st rility, 
self-discipline, and a therapeutic dyad defined by the clear hierarchy of analyst over 
analysand. Ferenczi, conversely, encouraged “enthusiasm about equality, openness, and 
mutuality, about blurring boundaries, transcending hierarchies, and sharing knowledge 
freely” (Berman, p.185). Ferenczi did not necessarily agree with Freud’s ideal ; instead, 
he found them to be unrealistic and designed his technique to respond to the realities of 
the analytic context. As the father of relational therapy, Ferenczi considered tr atment a 
form of mutual analysis.  He describes this analysis as follows: “The tears of doctor and 
patient mingle in a sublimated communion, which perhaps finds its analogy only in the 
mother-child relationship” (Cabre (taken from Ferenczi), 1998, p. 252).  Ferenczi is 
considered to have offered major contributions to this notion of communion: 
The first was that the analytic situation in which two human being attempt a 
sincere relationship. The second was that “one must give the love the patient 
needs.” Two human beings who attempt a sincere relationship in the name of love 
is what characterized Ferenczi’s technique of self-disclosing his feelings 
(Rachman, p. 264). 
 
Despite Ferenczi’s attempts to humanize the therapeutic relationship through the 
use of countertransference, Sigmund Freud shunned him. This, according to Cabre 
(1998), led to “one of the most remarkable processes of censorship in the history of 
psychoanalysis; Ferenczi’s ideas were forgotten [emphasis in the original] and 
condemned to silence” (p. 247). Thus, the issue of therapeutic love disappeared from the 
theoretical discourse for decades. 
 43
In 2000 Alex Stirzaker sought to make sense of this disappearance. Stirzaker 
(2000) argues that Freud’s endorsement of viewing erotic transference but not erotic 
countertransference as valuable clinical data created a sense of anxiety surrounding 
loving countertransference for clinicians. He argues that Freud’s attitude made “it harder 
for therapists to acknowledge their feelings,” and that countertransference “was more 
likely to be seen as therapeutic error than a potential therapeutic research tool” (Stirzaker, 
2000, p. 202). In an effort to reverse this perceived trend, or at least to demonstrate 
Freud’s impact, Stirzaker (2000) uses case studies from his own practice to questi n 
Freud’s assertions about the inherently flawed presence of countertransference in therapy. 
He argues that Freud’s beliefs underestimate the help countertransference can often 
provide in enhancing the therapeutic bond. Stirzaker (2000) offers examples that point to
the benefits provided by introducing countertransference into the relationship. He asserts 
that acknowledging erotic love helps therapists to “understand [clients] in the context f 
the client’s early relationships in order to help them develop and make sense of their 
present ways of relating” (Stirzaker, 2000, p. 207). He supports his argument through the 
use of a case example offered to him by his supervisor, a man in his early sixties. A 
female client in her early twenties was experiencing difficulties in her relationship with 
her husband. According to his supervisor, the client acted and dressed in sexually 
provocative ways. The therapist began to experience erotic, countertransferential fe lings 
towards this young woman. He explains: 
Through the erotic countertransference, Oedipal issues were being re-eact d in 
the therapy and these proved to be essential in understanding and resolving her 
difficulties in her relationship with her partner. Appropriate interpretation of these 
dynamics enabled [the client] to see her relationship with her partner in a different 
way. (Stirzaker, 2000, p. 204) 
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In opposition to Stirzaker’s (2000) positive findings, Glen Gabbard (2001) 
presents a clinical vignette of a male therapist whose revelation of erotic 
countertransference was therapeutically destructive. The examined case was elected 
from an article written by a peer, Lester, in 1995. The vignette examines a female client 
who responds negatively to her male therapist’s admittance of erotic feelings for her. She 
states, “Knowing that you have sexual feelings for me makes me feel unsafe here. This is 
just like what happened with my dad. He was always wanting to hug me and touch me, 
and I always had to be the one to set limits” (Gabbard, 2001, p. 990). This negative 
outcome illustrates the precariousness inherent in choosing to address sexual feelings in 
the therapeutic relationship. This is one of the few vignettes offered by a theoretician 
about an apparently more distant case that offers the potential for greater objectivity. 
From the vantage point of this presumed objectivity, Gabbard (2001) ultimately argues
for thorough premeditation before disclosing feelings of countertransference, particularly 
erotic countertransference. It is important to note, though, that despite his findings he 
does not completely dismiss countertransference’s clinical usefulness.   
The value of acknowledging loving countertransferential feelings, not just 
transference feelings, was studied by Gerald Schamess (1999). Schamess (1999) uses 
anecdotal data to endorse his thesis that “patients benefit when therapists recognize the 
sensual components in transference-countertransference interactions and use them to 
inform therapeutic interventions” (p. 9). Schamess (1999) agrees strongly with Freud’s 
assertion that transferential love should not be physically enacted. But, he writes, “my 
purpose is to encourage therapists to begin discussing the erotic and sensual substrata of 
wishes and fantasies that evolve reciprocally in treatment (even with ‘preoedipal’ 
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patients), at the level of fantasy and/or symbolic enactment” (Schamess, 1999, p. 10). He 
posits that erotic feelings typically evolve in relationships with large power differentials 
and suggests that contemporary clinicians must be mindful of this phenomenon. 
Schamess (1999) also states that the “healing action of psychotherapy is facilitated when 
therapists recognize their own as well as their patients’ contribution to what often 
becomes . . . a more or less secret dance of mutual desire” (Schamess, 1999, p. 11). It is 
the recognition of this mutuality by a few researchers that has enabled other theorists to 
examine countertransference, not just in terms of the erotic or hate, but in a complex and 
in-depth manner.    
 
Moving Beyond Countertransference into Authentic Love 
In the discussion of countertransference above, I mentioned the work of Sandor 
Ferenczi in the context of his mentor-student relationship with and subsequent shunning 
by Freud, as well as his contributions regarding the usefulness of countertransf ence. His 
contributions regarding the importance of therapeutic love have also been invaluable. In 
an address given at The Hague in the early twentieth century, Ferenczi express d his 
belief that “the progress of the cure bears no relation to the depth of the patient’s 
theoretical insight, nor to the memories laid bare” (Stanton, 1991, p. 133). Instead, his 
method was “developed to the fullest when he recognized that genuine sincerity and 
empathic attunement were the essential ingredients to reach a traumatized ind vidual” 
(Rachmann, 1998, p. 265). In a further elaboration on Ferenczi’s beliefs, Stanton (1991) 
writes that he “maintained that no progress whatsoever is likely to be made in 
psychoanalysis unless [we surrender] defense through distance” (p. 136). While Freud 
considered distance to be a necessary therapeutic technique, Ferenczi called it a defense. 
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In fact, Ferenczi encouraged the clinical surrendering of blind obedience, asserting  that 
this obedience was what had oppressed patients as children; consequently, these very 
patients required tenderness. Ferenczi argued that patients sought something else—love. 
He felt that treatment outcomes were directly correlated with the amount of love given by 
the analyst to the patient.  
Ferenczi’s unorthodox clinical discourse helped to set the stage for the 
development of relational psychoanalysis. It is within the relational model that 
conversations about authentic therapeutic love have finally begun to reemerge. According 
to Baur (1997), relational therapy can be defined as “the attempt to place therapist and 
patient on far more equal footing than conventional therapies . . . it emphasizes the 
curative power of the relationship that develops between them” (p. 222). Baur suggests 
that Ferenczi’s notions are the inspiration for what we now call relational ther py, stating 
that his “ideas on mutual analysis and on the real relationship that develops in spite of a 
clinician’s professional stance are more in vogue now than in his lifetime” (p. 222). 
Research on this mutuality has proceeded rapidly since the onset of relational 
thinking. In 2001, Glen Gabbard led a panel at the biannual meeting of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association. Judith Vida (2002), a panelist, answered Gabbard’s (2001) 
question, “Do you think there is any type of love felt by the analyst toward the patient 
that contributes to the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis?” (Vida, 2002, p. 437). Her 
response was as follows: 
It is not even possible for me even to enter my office in the morning of a clinical 
day without the hope and the possibility of love . . . How can I say what it 
contributes when it is not an option or a conscious choice whether it is there or 
not? This is like saying, “Does it contribute to the therapeutic action that the 
analyst draws breath, has a blood pressure and a pulse?” (p. 437) 
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Elaborating on Vida’s observations, Daniel Shaw (2003), also a relationalist, 
speaks to the importance of using precise language to describe the love that occurs in 
therapy beyond what seems to be transferred onto the relationship from a client’s history. 
He points to the contradiction between the therapeutic goal of enabling love and the 
failure to recognize the love that actually exists between therapist and clie t. Shaw (2003) 
performed a historical analysis of the understanding of analytic love. In his view, the 
results of this study contradicted the historical endorsement of professional neutrality. 
Instead, Shaw came to believe that theoretical “knowledge, rather than leading us to 
ignore, omit, or cancel our love, seems instead a call to persist in loving, as authentically, 
deeply, and respectfully and responsibly as we can” (Shaw, 2003, p. 275). Shaw (2003), 
in accordance with many of his contemporaries (Gabbard, 2001; Rabin, 2003; Schamess, 
1999), argues for a normalization of these loving feelings through research and, 
ultimately, principles for practice. Shaw posits that this love should be managed 
meticulously, but still recognized. He writes, “I am saying that analytic love is indeed 
complicated and dangerous, and like all loving, carries the potential for devastating 
disappointment . . . [But] at the heart of this endeavor, I believe, for both analyst and 
analysand, is a search for love, for the sense of being loveable, for the remobilizati n of 
thwarted capacities to give love and to receive love” (2003, pp. 252, 275).  
Arnold Bernstein also encourages deliberateness in managing loving feelings 
within the therapeutic frame. In order to dismantle the therapeutic fumbling created by 
Freud surrounding the management of emotive countertransference, Bernstein (2001) 
attempts to formulate a definition of love that invites analysts to explore the possibility of 
its presence. He argues that the lack of agreement about the definition of therapeutic lov  
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precludes a broader discussion of the phenomenon. His definition evolves from the 
following line of thought: 
[The analyst] is able to set aside her own needs in favor of those of. A 
renunciation of this sort is generally recognized as an act of love; and of the more 
than twenty varieties of love described in the dictionary, it certainly conforms to 
the one variety most clearly applicable to the therapeutic encounter, i.e., 
“benevolent concern for the good of another.” (p. 252) 
 
Gerald Gargiuolo (1999), Joseph Natterson (2003), and Daniel Shaw (2003) speak 
to the importance of identifying useful language to describe the love that occurs in 
therapy, beyond what feels transferred onto the relationship from a client’s history. 
Natterson (2003), who makes use of one of his own case studies, suggests that the 
presence of love has been perceived solely as a therapeutic problem. As an altern tive, he 
suggests that “therapy can be viewed as a specialized mutually loving relationship” 
(Natterson, 2003, p. 510). Gargiuolo concludes that therapy is most effective when “we 
are alive, when we can interact with those whom we love, not as salves for our injuries, 
but as possibilities for experiences. To be able to use ourselves, to be able to use our 
world by recognizing relationships, is to feel effective and related” (Gargiuolo, 1999, p. 
342).  
Herbert Rabin (2003), echoing these arguments, suggests that overtly discussing 
therapeutic love, rather than frustrating it, is curative. He asserts that loving feelings are 
an essential part of the therapeutic process. Further, he concurs that the efficacy of 
therapy and true change cannot occur without these feelings. He writes that the aim of his 
work is to “bring the loving feelings of the analyst into open professional dialogue” 
(Rabin, 2003, p. 2). He states that without this inclusion, a central healing force is neither
addressed nor understood. He arrives at these findings by researching three ofhis own 
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cases. Each clinical vignette concerns a female client between the ages of fifty and sixty-
five. He found, in all three clinical vignettes, that his female clients felt empowered by 
the self-disclosure of his loving feelings towards them. Rabin (2003) summarizes thes  
findings by concluding that “our love is . . . beneficial, even transformative, to patients” 
(p. 11). While his cases are embedded in a gendered power dynamic, perhaps the 
revelation of his loving feelings was a rebalancing act, an effort to gain equal footing 
through the exposure of mutual vulnerability.  
In contrast to Rabin’s cases, Florence Rosiello (2003) examines loving feelings 
within a same-sex relational dynamic. She sought to unmask the pervasiveness of 
ignoring same-sex transference and countertransference. She states that there re “few 
papers on erotic longings between female analysts with lesbian patients or heter sexual 
women patients, and there is an unfortunate lack of analytic literature on homoerotic 
transference and countertransference when both patient and analyst are heterosexual” (p. 
90). Robert Weinstein (2003) begins to unravel this problematic pattern in his piece “On 
Love, AIDS, and Emotional Contact in Psychotherapy.” In this article, he reflects upon a 
long-term case involving a patient named Bruce. Bruce and Dr. Weinstein met for ten
years before Bruce was diagnosed with HIV. In this article he contemplates the worth of 
visiting his client in the hospital. He offers the following vignette, which took place 
during this visit, to support his subsequent argument for the power of therapeutic love. He 
describes a conversation between him and his patient, a conversation filled with stories of 
love, family, and friendship. He describes the dialogue as “an intense, loving 
interchange.” He goes on to explain the depth of the emotions between them. “As I leave
to go, feeling closer to him in this moment than ever before, he holds me and cried into 
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my shirt, ‘I don’t want to die, I don’t want to die.’ I stroke his hair and say, ‘Get better; 
let’s continue our work together.’” As the therapist looks back, he witnesses an affective 
transformation. “His color is okay, and I feel right then that he will get better, which he 
does within a few days.  This incident, which touched me deeply, convinced me of the 
therapeutic power of love as never before” (p. 214). 
Weinstein (2003) offers this reflection in the hopes of convincing clinicians to use 
“sensitive and caring flexibility.” This love and flexibility, while absent from 
documented historical clinical work, may in fact set the tone for the profession’s future. 
Conclusion  
Applegate effectively synthesizes and distills the trajectory of the story that 
psychodynamic theory has told about love: 
No longer was the clinician to be objective and neutral, but he was given latitude 
to attend to, accept, and express his own affective responses. Countertransference, 
once seen as an impediment to objectivity that must be analyzed away, was in the 
object relations story an aspect of the clinician’s personhood that should be 
embraced and employed in trying to understand the client’s story. The moral of 
this story: The id may be fun, and the ego is useful; but objects that love you are 
better. (p. 116) 
 
If the maxim “the more love, the better” is indeed true, as many theorists are collectively 
beginning to argue, then research and theory around this idea must evolve. There is not 
yet clear discussion on how love in the therapeutic relationship should be transmitted, if 
at all. Should it be overtly discussed linguistically? Should we be telling our patients “I 
love you”? If not, are there other means by which this powerful emotion can be 
communicated within the framework of our profession?  
 Rorty (1989) dissects the etiology of theory as a process of language development 
requiring “new vocabularies and metaphors” (Applegate, p. 112). Without this new 
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language, we are left with the unwieldy power of love, unaware of how to harness it and 
cure with it. Open to the possibilities of love and the varying modes by which we can 
communicate it, our peripheral professional role might just become irresistible to the 
mainstream.  
 
 Conclusion and Implications 
In 1990, Lear wrote: “The idea of a science of subjectivity seems at first 
paradoxical: how could there be an objective study of subjectivity? And yet, Freud 
realized, there had to be such a study if we were to understand human existence” (Lear, 
4). Freud’s words ring ironically true in the effort to excavate the history of 
psychotherapeutic love in the treatment relationship. While he honored the essential value 
of researching the subjective, he also played a central role in the historical pau ity of 
research on the very subjective nature of psychotherapeutic love. 
There are many pitfalls in the scientific nature of this discussion. However, 
tolerating the opaque nature of love as a research topic makes the idea of studying i  
possible. In this dissertation I have linked the original erasure of love from the 
psychological canon as a byproduct of a singular relational failing between Freud and 
Ferenczi. This failing provides a metaphor for the power of relational failures and the 
subsequent long lasting nature of these failures. It also explicates the reality that theory is 
often linked to personality, and personality to culture and moments in time. Further, to 
examine the absence of love from our shared literature is to uncover the inextricable link 
between theory and culture. These two articles also lay the groundwork for future 
research and the clear lines that this research ought to take. Using grounded theory, an 
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exploration of both therapist and patient perceptions of the role and management of love 
in the psychotherapeutic relationship should occur. This would ideally inspire further 
research into how this love can be discussed in supervisory relationships, academic 
setting and train institutes. 
The effort to take love out of hiding, particularly in the framework of social work, 
is also a revelation about this moment in time. It is almost impossible to make sense of 
what precisely that revelation is, but I would speculate that it means something about the 
cutting edge nature of social work. Moreover, though, it is evidence of a pendulum 
swing. While evidenced based research and empirically informed technique are 
invaluable, the pervasive nature of their presence must be countered with an equally 
important dialogue about the art of social work, an art perhaps inspired by love. 
It is hope that these papers create several different ripple effects. Primarily, 
systematic permission must be granted for therapists in training to internally scan for the 
possibility of a range of affective responses that might arise in response to their clinical 
work. While self-awareness is preached sporadically in training, it was once a central 
tenet of social work education. This must be formally re-introduced. Without self-
awareness the unwieldy nature of love in psychotherapy can create boundary violations 
and ethical conundrums. With it, however, love can be used in not only a constructive 
manner, but possibly a curative one. What systematic means, is that the real complexity 
of our responses to clients ought to be introduced in the social work curriculum, into case 
discussions, into the teaching of theory. To teach practice ought to mean to teach 
tolerance for affective vulnerability, complexity and authenticity. Lost in the mist of 
increasingly manualized modes of treatment is the human experience that has long 
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informed social work’s commitment to the relationship. Love is the way back to that 
primal and core value of our work. Without introducing this to our youngest 
professionals, the most vulnerable populations struggle. This is often because our most 
inexperienced clinicians are typically matched with our most vulnerable treatment 
populations. This is a strong and sometimes troubling paradox of social work education 
and practice. Neglecting to equip our students with a sense of readiness for the feelings 
they might incur only negatively perpetuates it. Beginning to truly think about the very 
real presence of love in psychotherapy, attending to theory creation and research in the 
service of it, is the antidote to these trends. It is also social work’s ethical imperative. 
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